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Abstract 
 
This study develops the conceptualisation of regulation as a dynamic force, enabling 
and motivating actions that contribute to small company performance as well as being 
a burden, cost or constraint. Using interview and survey data from a study of preparers 
and users of small company abbreviated accounts, we argue that regulation generates 
contradictory consequences for small companies because both confidentiality and 
disclosure potentially serve their interests.  We present an analytical framework 
specifying the mechanisms through which regulation influences small company 
performance directly and indirectly. Regulation affects small companies directly by 
requiring the disclosure of financial information. Regulation also impacts small 
companies indirectly by influencing important stakeholders – for instance, banks, 
suppliers, customers, credit reference agencies, trade credit insurers and others - to 
provide vital resources, such as credit, and market opportunities. Indirect regulatory 
influences might be only partly visible to small companies, and to stakeholders, yet 
exert a powerful effect on performance.   
 
Keywords: regulation, financial reporting, disclosure, small company, abbreviated 
accounts, credit risk 
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Introduction and Research Objectives 
 
Business regulation has been an important subject of academic and policy debate in 
the UK for three decades (Kitching 2007).  International sources differ as to whether 
the regulatory burden on UK businesses is high (World Economic Forum 2012) or low 
(World Bank 2012).  The UK government has implemented several initiatives intended 
to reduce the regulatory burden, particularly for micro and small firms, as part of a 
policy agenda to make the UK one of the best places in Europe to start, finance and 
grow a business (HM Treasury/BIS 2011).  A key plank of this policy programme aims to 
improve the corporate governance framework, including financial reporting (BIS 
2013a).   
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of financial reporting 
regulation on small company performance using data from a study of the value of 
small company abbreviated accounts for preparers and users.  Performance refers to 
business outcomes sought by small company owners.  The study was conducted in the 
context of tighter product and credit markets following the global financial crisis of 
2008, although the argument and findings are intended to be of wider import (Kitching 
et al. 2011).  Specifically, the study seeks to answer two questions.  First, how does 
financial reporting regulation influence small company performance – does it constrain 
performance, enable higher levels of performance, or generate contradictory effects?   
Second, through what mechanisms does financial reporting regulation shape small 
company performance?  Does it produce performance effects solely through placing 
obligations directly on small companies – or, indirectly, through influencing the 
activities of small company stakeholders?  These questions go to the heart of 
contemporary academic and policy debates regarding the impact of regulation on 
businesses. Using the example of UK financial reporting regulation, we seek to 
contribute to these debates.    
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To address these questions, we elaborate on a theoretical framework developed 
previously (Kitching 2006, Kitching et al. 2013) and illustrate it empirically.  Our 
principal focus is on micro-level impacts, although we comment briefly on macro-level 
effects too.  We set out a framework specifying the various mechanisms through which 
regulation shapes small company performance, an approach that enables us to critique 
prior studies and propose new interpretations of empirical findings.  We argue that 
regulation mandating financial disclosure generates contradictory tendencies, enabling 
action that contributes to stronger small company performance as well as constraining 
such action.  The study is particularly pertinent in light of the UK government’s 
intention to act (BIS 2013a) on new European Accounting Directive (2012/6/EU), which 
permits Member States to exempt a new category of business, ‘micro-entities’, from 
certain financial reporting obligations (henceforth, the Micros Directive) (European 
Commission 2012).      
 
We begin by setting out the UK regulatory context for small company financial 
reporting.  Next, we review the literatures on regulation and small firm performance, 
small company financial reporting and the effects of disclosure on the cost of capital. 
Then, we outline our analytical framework and methodological approach before 
presenting the findings.  We conclude by briefly considering the wider implications of 
the study for understanding the influence of regulation on business performance more 
generally. 
  
The UK Regulatory Context  
 
The Fourth Company Law Directive (78/660/EEC) requires limited liability entities 
(most of which are companies) to prepare and file audited annual financial statements. 
The rationale for making accounts available at a public registry is that anyone should 
be able to access the financial statements.   Public disclosure is widely regarded as the 
price that companies must pay for the privilege of limited liability (Hicks and Goo 
2008).  In the UK, the requirements of the Fourth Directive are incorporated in the 
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Companies Act 2006, which obliges limited liability entities to prepare accounts giving 
a true and fair view, distribute their annual report and accounts to members and to file 
a copy at Companies House.  This allows accounts users such as present and potential 
investors, lenders and creditors, to assess the financial position, performance and 
prospects of the entity and to make informed economic decisions. 
 
The Fourth Directive allows Member States to provide options for qualifying small and 
medium-sized entities to register less detailed abbreviated accounts in place of the full 
statutory accounts, and for qualifying small entities to forgo the statutory audit. 
Member States can choose how far to relax the rules within the parameters of the 
Directive; the UK permits the greatest degree of abbreviation.  Small company 
abbreviated accounts comprise an abbreviated balance sheet with related notes; a 
profit and loss account is not required. The accounts therefore exclude commercially 
sensitive information on revenue and costs that might be useful to competitors and 
others.  Unless excluded for reasons of public interest,1 a UK company will generally 
qualify as small if it does not exceed any two of the following three thresholds: annual 
turnover £6.5 million; balance sheet total £3.26 million; and average number of 
employees 50. Apart from newly incorporated entities, these conditions must have 
been satisfied in two of the last three years.  In 2012/13, 2.5 per cent of UK registered 
annual accounts were categorised as ‘abbreviated - small’ (Companies House 2013: 
Table F2).  The ‘audit exempt’ category, comprising 72 per cent of accounts filed, 
includes many small companies filing abbreviated accounts, as these companies are 
also exempt from the statutory audit.  
 
The Micros Directive (2012/6/EU) permits Member States to exempt micro-entities 
(including companies, qualifying partnerships and qualifying limited partnerships) from 
certain financial reporting requirements otherwise applicable to small undertakings 
that impose unnecessarily onerous administrative burdens (BIS 2013a).  The Directive 
defines micro-entities as not exceeding two of three size criteria,2 permitting 
exemption from a general publication requirement, provided that balance sheet 
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information is filed with a designated authority and transmitted to the business 
register (European Commission 2012).3  The Directive seeks to reduce the 
administrative burden of statutory reporting and to align micro-entities’ reporting 
requirements with the purported real needs of users and preparers of accounts, whom 
it is argued do not require sophisticated accounting and extensive disclosures 
(European Union 2011).  Information filed by micro-entities might not be routinely 
made publicly available and instead be available only on request (Davies 2012).  The 
published Directive has watered down the original draft which exempted micro-
entities from any reporting requirement. Its impact on micro-entity reporting may, 
therefore, be more limited than envisaged initially.  The draft Directive estimated cost 
savings of €5.9-6.9bn (European Union 2011), a figure which should perhaps now be 
reduced.  The UK government has welcomed the Directive and plans to implement 
changes in October 2013 (BIS 2013b).   
 
Small Companies, Regulation and Financial Reporting  
 
Different literatures imply opposing positions regarding the impact of financial 
reporting regulation on small companies.  Most research examining the 
regulation/performance relationship in small enterprises conceptualises regulation and 
its effects in a partial, one-sided way (Kitching 2006).  Most studies emphasise the 
burdens, costs and constraints regulation imposes (e.g. Chittenden et al. 2002; 
Hansford et al. 2003; Crain and Crain 2010), which are assumed to deter start-up, 
investment, innovation and growth.  Studies rarely consider whether regulation might 
enable small enterprises to act in ways that benefit them (Kitching 2006), although 
there are exceptions (e.g. Edwards et al. 2003).  Nor do studies typically discuss the 
particular impact of financial reporting regulation on small companies; yet the 
burden/cost/constraint view of regulation provides the underlying rationale for the 
Micros Directive and the UK government response. 
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An alternative view of regulation derives from the financial reporting and cost of 
capital literature.  These studies focus on the benefits of disclosure for companies with 
regard to the availability and cost of capital, through reducing information 
asymmetries between companies and their external stakeholders (e.g. Healy and 
Palepu 2001; Beyer at al. 2010).  Disclosure enables stakeholders to address the 
information and agency risks faced by existing and potential investors, lenders and 
suppliers.  Stakeholders rely on the integrity of directors to provide high quality 
financial information in the annual report and accounts to mitigate the problem of 
information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  While most studies have focused 
on large, publicly listed companies and their access to capital markets, similar 
arguments have been proffered in relation to privately-held, informationally opaque 
small businesses seeking credit (Ang 1992; Binks et al. 1992; Fraser et al. 2013).  
Regulation mandating higher levels of disclosure might, therefore, improve access to 
finance for small companies.   
 
Stakeholders often seek public or private information on small companies, or make 
trading and financing conditional on the provision of collateral or personal guarantees 
(Ang 1992; Binks et al. 1992; Berry et al. 1993; Ang et al. 1995; Berger and Udell 2006).  
Some stakeholders possess the power to demand information privately from small 
companies in the form of detailed, timely management accounts (Berry et al. 2004; 
Marriott et al. 2006) and a proportion of UK micro and small companies file full, 
audited accounts voluntarily because the directors believe the benefits exceed the 
costs (Collis 2012).  Dedman and Kausar (2012) report that companies opting for 
voluntary audit enjoy significantly higher credit ratings than those choosing exemption.  
Cost savings arising from regulatory relaxations might be outweighed by the costs of 
preparing special purpose financial statements for individual stakeholders, particularly 
where such requests are common or where transactions involve more than two parties 
(Arruñada 2011).  Regulation, therefore, exerts contradictory pressures on small 
company performance, imposing constraints but also enabling access to vital resources 
and markets.   
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Conceptualising the Impact of Financial Reporting Regulation on Small Companies  
 
Drawing on a critical realist conception of regulation developed previously, as a system 
of state-authorised and –enforced rules, we theorise regulation as a dynamic force 
shaping small company performance (Kitching et al. 2013).  Regulation is a particular 
type of institution, possessing causal powers to influence business performance in 
particular ways - by mandating, prohibiting and enabling action by individuals and 
organisations.  Our conception of regulation is intended to enable explanation of its 
micro-level effects in market economies, in times of recession and in more buoyant 
conditions.  This approach permits us to highlight several key features of the 
regulation/performance relationship that other studies ignore or do not fully 
appreciate, and to make visible and explain a wider range of regulatory effects than 
studies adopting different approaches.  First, regulation only produces effects through 
the exercise of human agency by small companies and the stakeholders with whom 
they interact whose activities causally affect them.  Unless agents change their 
behaviour as a consequence of regulation mandating, prohibiting or enabling action, 
its impact is nil.     
 
Second, regulation generates dynamic influences on business performance by enabling 
and motivating action as well as constraining it, thereby producing variable firm-level 
performance effects (e.g. Edwards et al. 2003; Kitching 2006; Mayer-Schönberger 
2010; Kitching et al. 2013).  Regulation imparts contradictory influences 
simultaneously: it enables by making particular activities possible, it motivates by 
encouraging particular responses rather than others as well as constraining businesses.  
It is an empirical question whether, in particular cases, regulation’s constraining 
influences dominate the enabling ones.  Studies of small enterprises typically assume 
that regulation is necessarily constraining, but if this is true, how could small 
companies act at all?  Small businesses are subject to a great number of regulations 
and yet many still trade profitably.   
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Third, from the standpoint of an individual small company, regulation produces effects 
through a variety of mechanisms, directly and indirectly (Kitching 2007; Kitching et al. 
2013).  The consequences of regulation include not only the constraints imposed 
directly on small companies, including any purported ‘administrative burden’ or 
‘compliance cost’ (e.g. Chittenden et al. 2002), but also any enablements arising from 
stakeholder responses (Kitching 2006, 2007; Arruñada 2011; Kitching et al. 2013).  Our 
approach situates small companies at the centre of a network of stakeholders whose 
actions affect them.  Studies typically take a firm-centric view of the influence of 
regulation on small company performance, focusing on direct impacts, neglecting 
indirect impacts arising from stakeholder action, both as a response to small company 
adaptation to regulation and also from their responses and to the regulatory 
mandates, prohibitions and enablements placed directly upon stakeholders 
themselves.  Financial reporting regulation, for instance, influences small company 
performance directly by mandating the filing of accounts at Companies House and 
indirectly by shaping stakeholder provision of vital resources and market opportunities 
as a response to small company filing and other decisions.  Relevant stakeholders 
include customers, suppliers, banks, investors, credit reference agencies, trade credit 
insurers and others.  Indirect regulatory effects on small company performance via the 
actions of close and distant stakeholders are just as much a consequence of regulation 
as are the more obvious direct influences such as the administrative burden of filing 
accounts at Companies House.     
 
Regulation mandating higher levels of small company disclosure might encourage 
stakeholders to act in ways that enable companies to enhance performance by 
motivating customers to do business, suppliers to offer credit, credit reference 
agencies to award higher ratings and trade credit insurers to provide cover to policy-
holders trading with small companies.  Such arguments resonate particularly strongly 
in the post-financial crisis period, as the UK emerges, falteringly, from the deepest, 
longest recession for 80 years. Many small companies have struggled to access the 
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credit and market opportunities needed to survive in a testing trading environment 
(BIS 2012; BDRC 2013; Armstrong et al. 2013), particularly micro firms (Cowling et al. 
2012), following the 5-quarter recession of 2008-9 during which UK GDP fell 7 per cent 
(ONS 2013).  The recession led credit reference agencies to downgrade small firms’ risk 
ratings substantially (Fraser 2009).  Micro companies have poorer ratings than larger 
small businesses and small firms have become increasingly defined as higher risk (BIS 
2013c; BDRC 2013).  Stakeholders relying on credit ratings to support their business 
decisions might choose not to enter into relationships with small companies or refuse 
credit when requested.  Credit ratings take on a heightened significance, particularly 
where stakeholders are neither able nor willing to seek additional information from 
small companies privately. 
 
Conversely, where regulation permits reduced disclosure, as does the abbreviated 
accounts legislation, this might lead stakeholders to act in ways that constrain the 
reporting entity’s performance. Powerful stakeholders may withhold valuable 
resources with serious consequences for small companies (Kitching et al. forthcoming).  
Such pressures might be felt particularly keenly in times of recession when 
stakeholders are especially sensitive to the risks posed by financing or trading with 
small companies about whom they possess little information.  Small companies filing 
abbreviated accounts might experience difficulties accessing adequate finance or 
winning sufficient orders; in extreme cases, these problems might lead to market exit.  
Indirect regulatory influences emanating from stakeholder action might, therefore, 
exert just as powerful an effect on small company performance as the better-
understood direct administrative burdens and compliance costs.   
 
Fourth, the reality of regulatory effects, direct and indirect, is not dependent upon 
small company agents’ (directors, managers, employees) awareness of them (Kitching 
2006; Kitching et al. 2013).  Small companies are affected by regulation permitting 
them to file abbreviated accounts whether or not respondents perceive it as the cause 
of those effects.  Neither small company agents nor stakeholders possess perfect 
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information concerning regulatory processes and outcomes.  Regulation generates 
small company performance effects that are only partly visible to, or misperceived by, 
those affected, shaping action without entering agents’ conscious reasoning, and 
producing effects whether business owners (or stakeholders) are aware of them or 
not.    Small company agents might not know the reasons for failing to win new 
business or to access trade credit: indeed, they may be unaware of the very existence 
of stakeholders whose actions affect them.  The regulatory impacts experienced and 
reported by small company respondents constitute only a subset of the sum total of 
such impacts.   
 
Methodological Approach 
 
Quantitative survey approaches to investigating corporate financial reporting practices 
dominate the literature but arguably provide limited understanding of the 
motivational and process issues surrounding filing and using statutory company 
accounts.  The study, therefore, incorporates a strong qualitative component. Our 
arguments regarding the contradictory influences of financial reporting regulation are 
constructed from interview and survey data from both small companies and from a 
wide variety of stakeholders.  The qualitative data permits us to contribute fresh 
insights into small company owner rationales for filing abbreviated accounts, 
stakeholder perceptions of the value of abbreviated accounts, problems of limited 
disclosure and their influence on stakeholder decision-making and action.  We 
juxtapose small company views of the benefits of filing abbreviated accounts with the 
assessments of a diverse range of accounts users (Table 1).  While relying principally on 
the qualitative interview material for the analysis, we also draw selectively on postal 
and online survey data from small company preparers and stakeholders.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
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The small company preparers/users of abbreviated accounts samples were constructed 
from a stratified random sampling frame of 2,750 companies from three broad regions 
(London, Scotland, and the rest of England and Wales), assembled using the FAME 
database.  FAME identifies small companies filing abbreviated accounts and provides 
contact details.  The postal survey produced 149 responses from preparers of 
abbreviated accounts (response rate 5 per cent).  The survey collected data on: 
company profile; how directors discovered the option to file abbreviated accounts; the 
preparation of abbreviated accounts; reasons for filing abbreviated accounts; the use 
of other small companies’ abbreviated accounts; motivations for use; influence on 
decision-making; alternative information sources used and perceptions of the relative 
value of abbreviated accounts and other information sources.  Follow-up interviews 
were conducted with 12 small company respondents who were both preparers and 
users of abbreviated accounts; 42 per cent of small company preparers in the survey 
sample were also accounts users.  The 12 interview respondents were asked in depth 
about the rationale for, and circumstances surrounding, the filing decision, and the use 
of other small companies’ abbreviated accounts and their impact on decision-making 
and performance.  In both the small company survey and interview samples, three 
quarters of respondents were micro-companies.  We discuss survivors’ experiences 
only; we are unable to say whether surviving small companies differ from non-
survivors in their motivations for, and the consequences of, filing abbreviated 
accounts. 
 
The accounts users and intermediary sample comprises a diverse group of senior 
managers or officials in 18 organisations, including banks, credit reference agencies, 
credit insurance companies, professional bodies, trade associations and a small 
business membership organisation.  Respondents were asked questions regarding the 
value of small company abbreviated accounts, their influence on decision-making and 
their limitations.  As, at the outset of the study, we were unsure who used abbreviated 
accounts, we adopted a ‘snowball’ approach to sampling, inviting respondents to 
identify additional potential sources and, where possible, facilitate access: 50 
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organisations were approached, although most declined to participate on the grounds 
they did not use, or feel able to comment upon, such accounts.   
 
Survey and interview data were also obtained from two groups of accountants 
identified using the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland membership 
organisation database: accountants in practice working in their own businesses were 
distinguished from organisational accountants working in private, public and voluntary 
sector organisations.  The survey data from these two groups is drawn upon selectively 
in order to elaborate on particular processes.  
 
Next, we turn to the empirical findings in order to identify the constraining and 
enabling influences set in motion by financial reporting regulation. We begin by 
exploring small company respondents’ motivations for filing abbreviated accounts 
before examining stakeholder perceptions of the value of abbreviated accounts data, 
motivations for accounts use and problems of use. 
 
‘Filing the Legal Minimum’ – Regulation Enables Limited Public Disclosure  
 
Prior studies report restricting public disclosure of business information and following 
accountants’ advice as the principal reasons why small companies file abbreviated 
accounts (Collis and Jarvis 2000; POBA 2006).  The survey data from our small company 
respondents strongly support the literature on these points.  Small company 
respondents were asked their reasons for filing abbreviated accounts and to specify a 
primary reason.  Most reported following their accountants’ advice or emphasised 
confidentiality (Table 2).  But, crucially, in view of the Micros Directive and the UK 
government response, very few reported reasons consistent with the ‘administrative 
burden’ thesis: only 2 per cent reported ‘ease, simplicity, saving time’ as reasons for 
their filing choice.  The widespread availability of accountancy software means that the 
administrative cost of generating abbreviated accounts from the full accounts that 
must be prepared for members rarely constitutes a major burden (Arruñada 2011; 
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Collis 2012).  Survey data from accountants in practice also demonstrates their 
influence on the small company filing decision. Most reported their ‘default position’ 
with small company clients was to encourage filing abbreviated accounts: 71 per cent 
of the 240 accountants with small company clients at the time of the survey reported 
that all such clients filed such accounts.4  
  
Insert Table 2 here 
  
The interview data strongly reinforce the view that small company respondents file 
abbreviated accounts in order to limit disclosure rather than to avoid any alleged 
administrative burden.  A printer with 50 employees (Small Company 1) reported that 
he would always ‘file the legal minimum’ at Companies House in order to limit financial 
disclosure , while none of the 12 small company respondents interviewed reported 
administrative burdens.  In small companies, limiting public disclosure is a means of 
keeping both personal and corporate income details private; at very small levels of 
company scale, the two are barely distinguishable.  Accounts users might be able to 
estimate directors’ personal incomes where companies employ only their owners.   
 
“[Full accounts]5 would give more information to competitors, for one 
thing. But also because it’s a private company – so, essentially, just myself 
and my wife, who are the directors - it would give a great deal of 
information about our personal finances to the outside world which I don’t 
want them to know about.” (Company 3: tax consultancy, 2 employees) 
 
Restricting the public disclosure of information that stakeholders might use to harm 
small company owners’ interests facilitates greater influence over the terms of 
important external and internal stakeholder relationships – primarily with competitors, 
but also with customers, suppliers and employees.    Competitors, for instance, might 
be attracted to the company’s markets if they believe there are substantial profits to 
be made; high-margin items are often easier to identify in smaller companies where 
there are usually fewer product lines.  But, in addition, suppliers might raise prices, 
employees might seek higher salaries and customers might seek discounts in order to 
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capture a greater share of the value the company creates.  Small company 
respondents explained the importance of limiting disclosure in relation to competitors, 
suppliers and employees respectively; prior research has tended to focus on 
competitors alone. 
 
 “It was really to stop competitors finding out about us … My concern, for 
instance, with full accounts is that my competitors can find out my gross 
margins, which I don’t want them to know.” (Small Company 11: 
wholesaler, 3 employees) 
 
“It was unnecessary for us. We didn’t need to file full accounts ...  [The 
owners] don’t particularly want to publicise what we’re doing and how well 
we’re doing. I think that was the key driver in terms of filing abbreviated 
accounts. It was keeping things private. There’s no sense in letting 
suppliers work out how well we’re doing.” (Small Company 8: kitchenware 
wholesaler, 26 employees, italics denote respondent emphasis) 
 
“For example, we wouldn’t particularly want our staff to know what the 
directors’ remuneration was or any of that kind of thing. The less 
information we can lodge to meet our requirements is the way to go as far 
as we’re concerned.” (Small Company 10: flooring contractor, 11 
employees) 
 
Limiting disclosure might also influence client perceptions of company size.  Several 
small company respondents reported size concealment as a reason for filing 
abbreviated accounts, in order to win business from clients considered cautious to 
award contracts to small suppliers - although we lack data from clients to confirm such 
perceptions are valid. 
 
“If you’re working with large companies and people start pulling your 
accounts and saying, ‘Oh they only turned over 100 grand! We’d best not 
give them this order for 5,000 envelopes’. The public availability of 
information damages people.” (Small Company 5: mail service, 5 employees) 
 
Regulation permitting small company directors to ‘file the legal minimum’, abbreviated 
accounts, constrains and enables small company directors to act in particular ways.  
While imposing a reporting obligation upon them, this reporting option was valued 
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highly by the small company directors interviewed.  Not because it reduces the 
administrative burden of filing full accounts but rather because it enables them to limit 
public disclosure of information that stakeholders might use to harm them.  The small 
company respondents interviewed believed this enabled them to control access to 
sensitive personal and corporate information, facilitating greater influence over 
stakeholder relationships and permitting them to capture a larger share of the value 
their companies create.   
 
Regulation Mandating Disclosure Enables Small Company Access to Resources and 
Markets 
 
This section presents argument and evidence from accounts users to support the 
proposition that regulation permitting small companies to file the legal minimum 
requirement, abbreviated accounts, might constrain them regarding access to 
resources and markets.    Accounts users acquire small company information direct 
from Companies House and via intermediaries such as credit reference agencies.  
Assuming abbreviated accounts are downloaded from the Companies House website 
in proportion to their presence on the database, we estimate that approximately 
935,000 abbreviated accounts are downloaded annually.6  A large but unknown 
number of accounts users, in addition, access abbreviated accounts indirectly from 
intermediaries.   
 
Data from stakeholders suggests that published accounts often constitute the starting 
point for enquiry into small company creditworthiness, influencing the decision to 
continue or discontinue information search or, alternatively, such accounts comprise 
one element in a larger ‘information jigsaw’ stakeholders construct from a range of 
public and private information sources (Kitching et al. 2011, forthcoming).  Small 
company preparers’ survey data showed that many of them use statutory accounts, 
both abbreviated and full, when choosing a new supplier or customer, to find out 
about competitors or to consider an acquisition (Table 3).  Most small companies used 
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abbreviated accounts infrequently: only 20 per cent of users reported 10 or more uses 
in the previous year, and only 5 per cent reported 50 or more uses.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Most stakeholders reported abbreviated accounts to be a useful, though limited, data 
source to support credit risk assessments and decisions.  Some information is better 
than none, but most stakeholders were also critical of limited disclosure and, by 
extension, of the regulation permitting it.  One high street bank respondent referred to 
abbreviated accounts users as ‘users under sufferance’, whose motivation is based on 
accessibility and low cost, rather than because they are adequate for user needs.  The 
impact of abbreviated accounts regulation on stakeholders varies with the availability 
and cost of alternative information sources.  Stakeholders differed considerably in 
their capacity to access information privately and, consequently, in their perceptions 
of the value of abbreviated accounts (Kitching et al. forthcoming).  Powerful 
stakeholders such as banks and large suppliers and customers, for instance, are usually 
able to demand comprehensive, up-to-date financial information privately from small 
companies – or decline to place orders with, or offer credit to, them if they refuse.  For 
these stakeholders, the statutory abbreviated accounts are of limited value.  Small 
trading partners, credit reference agencies and trade credit insurers, on the other 
hand, might find it more difficult or costly to acquire information privately from small 
companies  and are thereby more dependent on the published accounts. Some 
stakeholders, moreover, might not wish to reveal their interest in particular companies 
by approaching them directly for information.  Stakeholders able and willing to access 
superior information privately are better placed to assess the creditworthiness of small 
companies in order to initiate, continue, renegotiate the terms of, or terminate, 
relations with them.   
 
Credit management professionals (credit reference agencies, trade credit insurers and 
professional bodies) were particularly critical of abbreviated accounts because of their 
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limited information content.  Such accounts required supplementation from other 
information sources in order to facilitate a well-informed credit, risk rating or 
insurance decision.  Limited disclosure, credit management professionals insisted, 
leads stakeholders to act cautiously, with adverse consequences for small companies – 
as seekers/beneficiaries of client orders, credit, risk rating and credit insurance 
decisions.  Several respondents reported that, other things being equal, companies 
with known turnover and profit data, both available in statutory full accounts, would 
likely obtain a superior credit rating than others - unless the published figures reveal 
poor performance.  
 
“The consensus view that I get forcibly … is that the abbreviated accounts 
are very difficult and really not worth much. Because, you know, you lose 
the detail that you can get from full accounts … At one level you can’t even 
see turnover … so it doesn’t help very much if you don’t know what level of 
stock they’ve got. The beauty of accounts is that you can understand the 
business and what makes it happen and how it’s comprised. Without full 
accounts you can’t do that. So it’s seriously limiting in terms of what 
conclusions you can draw from businesses’ activity and from its status.” 
(Stakeholder interview 15: trade association) 
 
For accounts users, abbreviated accounts provide only limited information, 
exacerbating the challenge of assessing credit risk, where they lack access to private 
information sources.  This has implications for stakeholder decision-making, for small 
companies themselves and for the wider economy in terms of the supply of credit and 
market opportunities.  Critics of abbreviated accounts were particularly vocal given the 
difficult business environment prevailing in the UK following the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
Assessing Small Company Credit Risk after the Financial Crisis 
 
Regulation exerts its influence in a wider socio-historical context.  The constraints it 
imposes, and enablements it affords, influence small company performance in 
particular ways at particular times.  Arguably, regulation permitting reduced statutory 
disclosure in difficult economic circumstances might contribute to deteriorating access 
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to resources and markets by discouraging credit provision and reducing demand for 
small company goods and services.    
  
Interview data from accounts users confirmed that credit risk assessments had 
tightened markedly as a consequence of the financial crisis.  Users increasingly 
perceived statutory accounts – both abbreviated and full – to be of only limited value 
because they are several months out of date on publication.7  The crisis intensified 
stakeholder demand for real-time management accounts or customer payment data 
(CBI/ACCA 2010).  Credit reference agencies, trade credit insurers and brokers treated 
small companies filing abbreviated accounts as greater credit risks than companies 
filing full accounts and, consequently, likely to suffer with regard to risk ratings and 
insurance cover. 
 
“We use them [abbreviated accounts] but that’s because it’s all that’s there 
for us. From our standpoint, we would want every company that’s limited, 
and regulated, to file full accounts … We want full transparency. That’s 
what we need. And, I think, frankly, that is what the whole of the credit 
management industry needs at this point in time.” (Stakeholder interview 
7: credit insurer) 
 
One credit insurer reported that the financial crisis had led to a ‘credit limit cull’ with 
policy-holder requests to obtain cover for their dealings with small businesses being 
declined unless up-to-date management accounts data were available.  Insurers 
reported being hit hard by a high volume of low value claims, typically arising from 
small firm defaults, and had taken a more cautious approach to issuing trade credit 
insurance cover.  Such claims are supported by secondary sources.  Association of 
British Insurers data indicated a 227 per cent increase in the value of claims to £125m 
between Q3, 2008, and Q3, 2009 (ABI 2009).  Poorer provision of trade credit 
insurance cover impacts small companies indirectly as prospective clients and creditors 
withdraw credit facilities and market opportunities.   
 
“There is a direct correlation between the abbreviated accounts that are 
filed, the content of those accounts and the level of cover that we can 
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obtain for our clients … It was only when we hit a crisis and liquidity started 
to be strained that insurers found it difficult to, or were unwilling to, 
provide some level of cover that was previously given - and they used a 
lack of information for not granting credit.” (Stakeholder interview 16: 
trade credit broker) 
 
The consequences of limited small company disclosure for the wider economy are also 
likely to be adverse.  In a difficult economic environment, businesses might choose not 
to trade with suppliers and customers about whom they know very little.  Better 
information facilitates trading, credit allocation and economic development.  Recent 
regulatory changes according to one stakeholder had restricted the value of 
abbreviated accounts to users:  
 
“They have lost value, significant value, over the past decade, and I would 
say that whilst we had benign economic conditions in this country, for the 
best part of 10-15 years, these law changes in terms of changing small and 
medium company thresholds, raising them, also introducing unaudited 
accounts, a couple of years ago, for small businesses. These changes to 
legal obligations went almost unnoticed by the credit world because, 
basically, as we all know, credit was just so easy to get hold of no-one gave 
a damn ... It took the first economic downturn, in my opinion, to expose 
the folly of these government decisions.” (Stakeholder interview 10: credit 
reference agency) 
 
Summarising, accounts users made it clear that credit risk assessments were 
particularly responsive to wider economic circumstances.  Trade suppliers, credit 
reference agencies, insurers and brokers reported a heightened sensitivity to credit 
risk and a tightening of risk ratings, credit provision and credit insurance cover.  
Regulation permitting small companies to file abbreviated accounts might, therefore, 
indirectly impact their performance adversely by constraining their capacity to access 
trade credit and to win new business.  While such difficulties are mitigated by small 
companies providing information privately to stakeholders, there are limits to their 
ability to share information with large numbers of potential trading partners.     
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The Partial Visibility of Indirect Regulatory Influences 
 
The analytical framework presented specifies a range of mechanisms through which 
regulation influences small company performance.  While direct regulatory burdens, 
costs and constraints are well-researched and understood, regulation also generates 
impacts on small companies indirectly as a consequence of stakeholder activity.  .  
Stakeholder action and its effects may not be fully visible to, or misperceived by, small 
company agents.  This section presents data from stakeholders and from secondary 
sources to support these arguments.  
     
Where stakeholders respond to small company decisions to file abbreviated accounts 
by refusing to trade with, or provide credit to, them, owners and directors might not 
attribute such responses to the regulation.  Substantial data has been presented from 
a variety of accounts users to show that limited disclosure influences their decisions to 
withhold credit and market opportunities, to award higher credit risk ratings and to 
refuse trade credit insurance cover to those trading with small companies.  Several 
stakeholders questioned whether small companies were fully aware of the risks 
associated with filing abbreviated accounts, or of the benefits of greater disclosure 
with regard to access to trade credit.   
  
“A lot of companies say there’s no negative impact. But they may not know 
they’ve had their credit limit reduced. They may not know that they could 
have opened up more credit with a particular supplier had they had that 
information available to them.” (Stakeholder interview 9: credit reference 
agency) 
 
The partial visibility of indirect regulatory effects is explicable in terms of accounts 
users acting without small company awareness of their decisions or effects.  Several 
stakeholders reported using abbreviated accounts to identify possible suppliers, 
customers and acquisition targets, for example, without alerting the target company of 
interest. 
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“With credit information, they don’t know who’s making enquiries on them 
... Small businesses, whether they like it or not, or whether they 
understand it or not, they are suffering as a result of the lack of 
information.” (Stakeholder interview 10: credit reference agency) 
 
In contrast, none of the 12 small company interview respondents reported losing 
customers or being unable to access sufficient finance because they filed abbreviated 
accounts.  All claimed to have access to sufficient internal or external finance to fund 
current operations and future plans.  So how might these contrary pieces of evidence 
be assessed?  
 
First, it is possible that our sample of 12 small company interview respondents had 
suffered no disadvantage arising from filing abbreviated accounts.  Indeed, we 
recognise that small companies are a highly heterogeneous population; not all will be 
affected adversely, or to the same degree, by limiting statutory disclosure.  For some – 
perhaps sole director companies operating alone without employees, with few 
tangible assets, funded by personal savings, with no intention to expand or desire for 
external finance, and trading mainly with customers whose decisions are not 
influenced by credit reference agencies or insurers – the impact of filing abbreviated 
accounts may generally be limited.  Second, most small company respondents insisted 
that filing abbreviated accounts caused no disclosure problems.  If major stakeholders 
requested the management accounts, these could be made available.   
 
Both points no doubt have merit for particular companies but we would question 
whether such arguments can be generalised to the entire UK small company 
population.  A point stakeholders made forcefully was that small companies might miss 
credit and market opportunities because prospective clients decide not to approach 
them, or because suppliers choose not to offer credit, because they file abbreviated 
accounts and were either unable or unwilling to seek further information from the 
company privately.  Small company respondents, they claimed, would not necessarily 
be aware of this.  The intensity of accounts user criticism that poor information 
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contributes to credit supply problems, particularly by credit management 
professionals, suggests that small companies are often unaware of the disadvantages 
of filing abbreviated accounts in specific circumstances.  Our argument does not rest 
on small company respondents being entirely ignorant of the consequences of their 
filing decisions, but rather on them being only partly cognisant of the effects of their 
actions as regulated entities on the stakeholders with whom they interact.   
 
More generally, evidence from respected sources (Bank of England 2009), suggests 
that the tightening of credit and commodity markets contributed to higher levels of 
small company liquidation following the onset of the financial crisis (Insolvency Service 
2013).  Many companies ceased trading during the recession, the vast majority of 
which are likely to have been small.  There were 19,077 compulsory company 
liquidations and creditors’ voluntary arrangements in England and Wales during 2009, 
a 23 per cent increase on 2008 (Insolvency Service 2013).8  Even if our interview 
sample of 12 small companies reported few problems accessing the orders and credit 
sought, many others have not been so fortunate.    
 
Regulation generates effects on small companies directly and indirectly, with and 
without directors’ (or stakeholders’) knowledge. Direct regulatory influences are 
perhaps easier to identify: small company directors find it easier to report a legislative 
burden imposed on them, or to report their response to a regulatory constraint.  But 
indirect regulatory influences on small companies, shaped by the actions of close or 
distant stakeholders, impact such companies, even where such effects go unperceived, 
or unattributed, by small company respondents themselves.  While offering the 
benefit of limited disclosure, filing abbreviated accounts might also generate 
unintended, difficult-to-manage effects, such as market opportunities not won, lower 
credit ratings restricting access to finance, and the higher cost of credit insurance 
increasing the cost of trade credit from suppliers.  Such problems are likely to be 
aggravated in future where stakeholders place a higher value on comprehensive, real-
time information to assess and address risk. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
Regulation, including financial reporting regulation, is a dynamic influence on small 
company performance.  In contrast to studies that focus solely on the burdens, costs 
and constraints regulation imposes directly on small companies, we have presented an 
analytical framework specifying a range of different mechanisms through which 
regulation might also enable and/or motivate small companies to achieve higher levels 
of performance and sought to illustrate its value empirically.  To do this we have drawn 
on data from a study of the value of abbreviated accounts to small company preparers 
and a wide range of accounts users.  Regulation impacts businesses directly and 
indirectly, influencing small company agents and their stakeholders to act in ways that 
contribute to higher levels of performance as well as constraining them.  Managing 
contradictory regulatory influences is the normal condition of doing business and small 
companies would face this task under any regulatory regime and in any 
macroeconomic conditions.   
 
How such contradictory influences play out in particular settings is contingent upon 
how small company agents, and stakeholders, exercise their agency.  Small company 
directors may or may not choose to take up the opportunity to file abbreviated 
accounts; and stakeholders choose how to respond to small company filing choices, by 
offering or withholding valuable resources and market opportunities. Financial 
reporting regulation can motivate stakeholders to provide orders, finance, and credit 
ratings to small companies, and to provide trade credit insurance cover to 
organisations trading with small companies.   These decisions are as much an effect of 
regulation permitting the filing of abbreviated accounts as any purported reduction in 
the administrative burden of financial reporting obligations.   
 
For small companies, the contradictory consequences of financial reporting regulation 
arise from the paradox that both confidentiality and disclosure potentially serve their 
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interests.  Inevitably, therefore, financial reporting regulation imparts contradictory 
pressures on small companies.  Regulation mandating, or facilitating, greater 
confidentiality protects small companies from stakeholders whose actions might cause 
them economic harm while, at the same time, limiting access to the resources and 
market opportunities that clients, credit reference agencies, trade creditors and 
insurers might offer, possibly unbeknown to small company agents themselves.  
Regulation mandating greater information disclosure enhances the potential benefits 
while also making it easier for competitors, suppliers, employees, customers and 
others to appropriate a higher share of the value the company creates.  In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, and the part played by poor credit risk assessment, 
greater disclosure is increasingly valued as a means of assessing credit risk.  Today, 
regulation permitting small companies to file abbreviated accounts might indirectly 
constrain performance more than laws mandating increased disclosure, whatever 
policy-makers intend.   
 
Our findings have wider implications for understanding the influence of regulation on 
small company performance.  Focusing on a single subset of regulatory influences, as 
many studies have done – the direct constraints placed on small companies – provides 
only a partial insight into regulatory processes and outcomes.  Indirect regulatory 
influences are potentially just as important, although more difficult to identify – 
indeed, they may be only partly visible to small company agents themselves.  
Researchers, policy-makers, support providers and practitioners need to be alert to the 
possible opportunities for small companies arising from regulation as well as to the 
constraints imposed.  Policy-makers might wish to consider carefully the likely 
consequences of taking up the regulatory relaxations permitted by the Micros 
Directive (2012/6/12) as this might generate more problems than benefits for many of 
the companies who are its intended beneficiaries. 
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Table 1. Respondent groups 
 
 Survey  
sample 
Interview 
sample 
Small company preparers/users of abbreviated 
accounts 
149 12 
Accounts users and intermediary bodies - 18 
Accountants in practice 255 10 
Organisational accountants 159 10 
 
 
Table 2. Small companies’ reasons for filing abbreviated accounts 
 
 % of small companies 
reporting as the 
primary reason 
% of small companies 
reporting as  
a reason 
Following accountants’ advice   65   71 
To reduce public disclosure   26   42 
Lower costs     5     5 
Ease, simplicity, save time     2     2 
Other reasons     2     2 
All 100 N/A 
Base: Small company postal survey (n = 149) 
Note: Respondents could rank up to three reasons as first, second or third most 
important 
 
 
Table 3. Small companies’ use of abbreviated accounts 
 
 % of small companies reporting  
use of source 
Any source 42 
Potential customers 24 
Competitors 21 
Existing customers 13 
Existing suppliers 11 
Potential suppliers 11 
Potential collaborative partners   8 
Potential acquisitions   5 
Potential investors   1 
Other sources   6 
Base: Small company postal survey (n = 149) 
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Endnotes 
                                      
1 Under the Companies Act 2006, ‘an entity is excluded from the small companies 
regime if it is a public company, a company that is an authorised insurance company, a 
banking company, an e-money issuer, an ISD investment firm or a UCITS management 
company, or carries on insurance market activity, or is a member of an ineligible group’ 
(c. 46, Part 15, Chapter 1, p. 178). 
2 These criteria are: total assets of £289,415 (€350,000), net turnover of £578,830 
(€700,000), and average employment of 10. Calculated at the exchange rate of 
€1=£0.82690 published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 10 April, 2012, 
the date the Directive came into force.  
3 The Directive also permits exemption from other accounting and reporting 
obligations (BIS 2013a). Our concern is solely with publication of the annual accounts.  
4 Fifteen accountants are excluded because respondents reported no small company 
clients at the time of the survey or because none filed abbreviated accounts. 
5 Square brackets contain text inserted to retain the sense of verbatim quotations.  
6 During April-November 2010, there were 1.001m downloads (or 1.5015m per 
annum). An estimated 62.3 per cent of accounts filed during April-December 2010 
were small company abbreviated accounts. 1.5015m x 62.3 per cent = 934,435 
downloads (email communication with Companies House). This figure may be subject 
to error due to variation in accounts classification. It is not possible to estimate the 
number of users accessing abbreviated accounts indirectly via intermediaries such as 
credit reference agencies or FAME. 
7 Some users were also sceptical of the quality of statutory accounts as Companies 
House does not validate the accounts filed. Exemption from statutory audit reinforced 
such scepticism.   
8 Annual insolvency figures for 2010 through 2012, though slightly lower at 16,045, 
16,886 and 16,138 respectively, were higher than in the years immediately proceeding 
the 2008 recession (Insolvency Service 2013). 
